IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR POLK COUNTY

RUKHSANA DRAHOZAL, ***Petitioners*,** **v.** **ENVOY AIR, INC. d/b/a AMERICAN AIRLINES GROUP,** ***Employer*** **NEW HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,** ***Insurance Carrier, Respondents.***	**Case No. CVCV057115** **RULING ON PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW**

This matter came before the Court on April 5, 2019, for hearing before the District Court on review of a final decision of the Iowa Workers' Compensation Commission. Petitioner, Rukhsana Drahozal ("Drahozal") was represented by attorney Thomas Wertz. Respondent, Envoy Air, Inc. d/b/a American Airlines group, Employer, and New Hampshire Insurance Company ("New Hampshire"), the insurance carrier were represented by Attorney's Jean Dickson and Lori N. Scardina Utsinger. Respondent also filed a Cross-Petition for Judicial Review. Upon review of the court file and the applicable law, the court enters the following order:

I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE.

Drahozal was injured while employed by American Airlines working at the Eastern Iowa Airport in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. She had been employed by them for approximately sixteen years. As part of her duties, Drahozal was responsible for de-icing the planes in the winter. On January 4, 2015, while she was de-icing the planes, seepage from the de-icing solution soaked through

her gloves onto her hands. Because her hands were already cold and thus partially numb, she did not realize the possible damage that had occurred. Over the next few days after the incident, Drahozal's fingers began turning "reddish-brown" causing her to decide she needed to report the injury to her supervisor.

On January 11, 2015, Drahozal went to the St. Luke's Emergency Department for pain and swelling in her fingers. She was diagnosed with frostbite of eight fingers with a blister and necrosis by Dr. Nathan Harmon, M.D. Dr. Harmon referred Drahozal to the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics (UIHC) Burn Treatment Center.

Drahozal was seen at the UIHC Burn Center on January 12, 2015. She was seen by Robin Behr, Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner. Behr tended to Drahozal's wounds and prescribed Lortab, a prescription pain medication.

Drahozal visited the UIHC Burn Center again for pain in her fingertips on January 22, 2015 and was again seen by Behr. Behr noted Drahozal had "firm, black eschar on the end of digit 2 of the left hand. The distal ends of digit 2 of left hand and digit 3 of right hand are hardened to touch and fingertips with minimal sensation." Behr prescribed Tramadol, a prescription pain medication to treat the pain.

Drahozal was seen again on January 29, 2015, at the UIHC Burn Center by Robert Lewis II, Physician Assistant. Lewis found Drahozal suffered frostbite to all of her fingers except to her fifth digit, or "pinky finger". Lewis further found the deepest injury was to her middle finger tips as they were swollen and showed a loss of tissue. Lewis restricted Drahozal to temperatures between sixty and eighty degrees and told her to avoid harsh chemicals and blunt trauma. Lewis then recommended Drahozal wait one-year before having an impairment evaluation in order to monitor how her fingers recover over time.

Drahozal continued treatment and, at one point, a brown tip fell off her finger. She remained in pain, her hands were stiff and she was mostly unable to use her hands for their regular functions. Gretchen Kass, Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner, prescribed Gabapentin for the pain, referred her to occupational therapy, and restricted Drahozal from working.

On March 19, 2015, Drahozal was seen at the UIHC Burn Clinic for extreme pain in her fingers causing her anxiety. Lewis prescribed Amitriptyline to help Drahozal sleep and referred her to the UIHC Pain Management Clinic and for counseling services.

Drahazol began receiving treatment at the UIHC Pain Management Clinic in July 2015. She saw Dr. Shuchita Garg, M.D. who recommended pharmacologic treatment, use of a TENS unit, desensitization exercises, occupational therapy, pain psychology, and counseling.

Drahozal attended an appointment with Frank Gersch, Ph.D, as an authorized workers compensation psychological provider on October 27, 2015. Dr. Gersch diagnosed Drahozal with major depressive disorder, single episode, moderate. She continued to receive treatment from Dr. Gersh who restricted Drahozal from working on January 13, 2016.

Dr. Joseph Chen, M.D. conducted an independent medical examination of Drahozal on January 25, 2016. He diagnosed her with chronic bilateral fingertip pain related to a work injury. He opined that no further treatments were likely to help and all treatments should be discontinued. Dr. Chen placed Drahozal on maximum medical improvement and released Drahozal to return to work with no restrictions. Dr. Chen assigned a two percent body as a whole impairment rating.

Dr. Gersh continued to treat Drahozal every two weeks for Major Depressive Disorder which he confirmed was related to her work injury. He reported she needed additional treatment and referred Drahozal to psychiatrist, Dr. Mark Mittauer, M.D.

On June 3, 2016, New Hampshire informed Drahozal that because Dr. Chen had placed her at Maximum Medical Improvement, without restrictions, they would not pay healing period benefits.

On June 24, 2016 Drahazol had a psychiatric evaluation with Dr. Mittauer. Dr. Mittauer diagnosed Drahozal with Major Depressive Disorder, single episode, severe, without psychotic features, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, other specified anziety disorder including panic attacks and an insomnia disorder. Dr. Mittauer prescribed Venlafaxine and Zolpidem and discontinued the use of Amitriptyline.

During this time, Drahozal's niece was molested by a family member, an unrelated event which New Hampshire claims caused Drahozal's continued symptoms.

On July 20, 2016, Drahozal notified American she was retiring.

On September 1, 2016, Dr. Mittauer issued an opinion letter diagnosing Drahozal with Major Depressive Disorder caused by her January 2015 work injury.

New Hampshire retained two doctors to conduct independent psychiatric evaluations of Drahozal, Dr. Terrence Augspurger, M.D., and Amy Mooney, Ph.D. They each reviewed the records and examined Drahozal. They both diagnosed Drahozal with major depressive disorder, recurrent, with prior depressive episodes following pregnancy and delivery, severe with anxious distress, and other specified personality disorder with borderline dependent features. They found no causation, claiming if a history of previous episodes were acknowledged, then any new

episode is likely just a manifestation of the pre-existing event based on the AMA Guide to the Evaluation of Disease and Causality and Injury Causation.

On October 3, 2016, New Hampshire informed Drahozal that her injuries were due to stress caused by family events and not her work injury and additional treatment would not be authorized.

Dr. Mittauer responded to the report prepared by Drs. Augspurger and Mooney and said they provided no documentation of any symptoms Drahozal had at the time of postpartum depression that would lead to their diagnosis. Dr. Mittaur opined that Drahozal's depression following the delivery of her children did not manifest severe enough symptoms to meet the criteria for Major Depressive Disorder and that any symptoms from that event had resolved completely. He also opined she had sufficient symptoms to satisfy a separate diagnosis of Generalized Anxiety Disorder.

On March 22, 2017, New Hampshire sent Drahozal a letter informing her that because Dr. Auspurger did not find causation, they were disputing all liability as to further care and treatment including the mental health treatment.

On April 17, 2017, Dr. Gersch opined he had diagnosed Drahozal with Major Depressive Disorder and opined it was caused by her work injury. In response to the report prepared by Drs. Augspurger and Mooney, he further poined out Drahozal was never diagnosed with postpartum depression giving rise to a criteria for a depressive episode. Dr. Gersch further stated:

> Drs. Augspurger and Mooney provide no documentation of the symptoms she had at the time that might lead to a diagnosis of a depressive disorder. When I asked her about the "episode," she denied sleep disturbance and appetite disturbance, poor memory and poor concentration, suicidal ideation and other symptoms of depressive disorders during the post-partum period. She simply felt "blue." She did not, by her report, meet DSM-5 criteria for any sort of depressive disorder at that time.

> Additionally, post-partum depression is different from other depressive disorders in that it does not apparently predispose a person to future. episodes of depression. Indeed, the opposite seems to be true. Postpartum depression may have a protective effect and reduce the likelihood of another depressive episode according to an article by Cooper and Murray in the British Journal of Psychiatry (Cooper, P. and Murray, L; Course and recurrence of postnatal depression: evidence for the specificity of the diagnostic concept. British Journal of Psychiatry, 1995; vol. 166: pages 191-195). The authors found that the recurrence rate for Major Depressive Disorder, given an initial episode, is 62%, while the likelihood of an episode of Major Depressive Disorder, given an episode of postpartum depression, is only 38%. There is little research on this subject, but this study is suggestive that the research findings on recurrent episodes of Major Depressive Disorder does not apply to postpartum depression.
>
> Even if she did suffer from a diagnosable depressive disorder postpartum, the fact that she developed depression after her work injury and the temporal relationship between the injury and the development of the depression, make it very difficult to conclude that anything other than the injury caused or exacerbated the depression. Even if post-partum depression made it more likely that she would develop a later episode of depression (and the evidence suggests this is not true), there is not a 100% chance that a postpartum depression would predispose to a later episode of depression. Therefore, it cannot be said that the work injury is not causative. In fact, it is less than 50% likely according to the Cooper and Murray article.

Hearing Ex. 1, p. 8-9. Drahazol also retained Dr. Sunil Bansal, M.D., an occupational medicine physician to conduct an independent medical examination. Dr. Bansil opined Drahozal suffered frostbite and assigned a nine percent body as a whole impairment for the dominant right hand injuries and a four percent body as a whole impairment for the left hand, with a thirteen percent total body as a whole impairment. Dr. Bansal recommended a five pound lifting restriction and no frequent squeezing, pinching or grasping.

Dr. Augspurger and Mooney were given the opportunity to respond to the opinions of Dr. Mittauer and Dr. Gersh. The doctors said they stood by their original opinions that the mental injuries stemmed from postpartum depression.

At the time the hearing occurred, Drahozal was still receiving treatment from Dr. Gersch and Dr. Mittauer.

Drahozal testified at hearing he had to re learn how to do many daily things and lacks motivation to do daily tasks. She said she has difficulty sleeping and has a poor energy level.

At the time of the hearing, Drahozal testified she had not applied for any other jobs.

The Arbitration Hearing occurred on August 14, 2017, in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, in front of Deputy Workers' Compensation Commissioner Heather Palmer ("Deputy Palmer"). Attorney Thomas Wertz represented Drahozal. Drahozal and her husband appeared and testified. Attorney Jean Dickson represented American and New Hampshire. The parties stipulated that Drahozal suffered a work-related injury to her hands. At issue, was the contention that she also suffered a complex regional pain syndrome and mental health sequelae injuries.

Deputy Palmer issued her decision on December 21, 2017. Deputy Palmer found the Claimant sustained suffered an eighty percent industrial disability and awarded four hundred weeks of permanent partial disability benefits. Deputy Palmer also found Drahozal was entitled to healing period benefits from January 12, 2015 through February 10, 2017. Deputy Palmer found New Hampshire liable for all causally-related medical bills and mileage. Deputy Palmer awarded penalty benefits for benefits that were paid late, and declined to award penalty benefits for the denial of mental health benefits for the sequela injury. New Hampshire was also assessed the costs of the action. Both parties appealed this decision on intra-agency appeal to the Iowa Workers' Compensation Commissioner, Joseph Cortese II. Commissioner Cortese affirmed the decision of Deputy Palmer on all grounds in a decision dated September 12, 2018 decision.

On October 5, 2018, Drahozal filed a Petition for Judicial Review alleging the Commissioner erred in assessing industrial loss at eighty percent and denying Drahozal's odd-lot claim, and the commissioner erroneously denied penalty benefits in accordance with Iowa Code section 86.13.

On October 25, 2018, New Hampshire filed a Counter-Petition for Judicial Review alleging the decision to award an eighty percent industrial disability rating rather than a scheduled disability finding was improper, the Agency's finding that Drahazol was entitled to penalty benefits was improper, and the decision allowing healing period benefits, medical expenses, and costs was not supported by substantial evidence.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

Final decisions rendered by the Iowa Workers' Compensation Commission are reviewed by the district court under Iowa Code Chapter 17A, the Iowa Administrative Procedures Act. *Ramirez-Trujillo v. Quality Egg, L.L.C.,* 878 N.W.2d 759, 768 (Iowa 2016), *reh'g denied* (May 27, 2016); *see* Iowa Code § 86.26 (2019). "Under the Act, [a court] may only interfere with the commissioner's decision if it is erroneous under one of the grounds enumerated in the statute, and a party's substantial rights have been prejudiced." *Meyer v. IBP, Inc.,* 710 N.W.2d 213, 219 (Iowa 2006). The standard of review depends on the type of error alleged by the Petitioner. *Jacobson Transp. Co. v. Harris*, 778 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Iowa 2010). When an agency has been "clearly vested" with a fact-finding function, the "standard of review depends on the aspect of the agency's decision that forms the basis of judicial review." *Burton v. Hilltop Care Center*, 813 N.W.2d 250, 256 (Iowa 2012) (quoting *Evercom Systems, Inc. v. Iowa Utilities Board*, 805 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Iowa 2011)). The standard of review depends on if the alleged error involves an issue of (1) findings of fact, (2) interpretation of law, or (3) an application of the law to facts. *Id.*

If the alleged error is one of fact, the standard of review is whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence. *Harris*, 778 N.W.2d at 196; *Schutjer v. Algona Manor Care Ctr.,* 780 N.W.2d 549, 557 (Iowa 2010). "[A] reviewing court can only disturb those factual

findings if they are 'not supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record is reviewed as a whole.'" *Burton*, 813 N.W.2d at 256 (quoting Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)). The Court "is limited to the findings that were actually made by the agency and not other findings the agency could have made." *Id.* "In reviewing an agency's findings of fact for substantial evidence, courts must engage in a 'fairly intensive review of the record to ensure the fact finding is itself reasonable.'" *Neal v. Annett Holdings, Inc.*, 814 N.W.2d 512, 518 (Iowa 2012) (quoting *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Caselman*, 657 N.W.2d 493, 499 (Iowa 2003)).

"Evidence is substantial if a reasonable person would find the evidence adequate to reach the same conclusion." *Grundmeyer v. Weyerhaeuser Co.*, 649 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Iowa 2002) (citing *Ehteshamfar v. UTA Engineered Sys. Div.,* 555 N.W.2d 450, 452 (Iowa 1996)). The District Court is "not to determine whether the evidence supports a different finding; rather our task is to determine whether substantial evidence, viewing the record as a whole, supports the findings actually made." *Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Pease*, 807 N.W.2d 839, 845 (Iowa 2011) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

When the alleged error is in the Commissioner's interpretation of law, the standard of review is whether the commissioner's interpretation was erroneous. *See Clark v. Vicorp Rests., Inc.*, 696 N.W.2d 596, 604 (Iowa 2005). If the claimed error is in the ultimate conclusion reached, "then the challenge is to the agency's application of the law to the facts, and the question on review is whether the agency abused its discretion by, for example, employing wholly irrational reasoning or ignoring important and relevant evidence." *Meyer*, 710 N.W.2d at 219; Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(i), (j).

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

There are four issues before this court: (1) did substantial evidence support the award of industrial disability at eighty percent, (2) did substantial evidence support the finding of permanent total disability, (3) were penalty benefits properly imposed, and (4) were healing period benefits, expenses, and costs properly imposed. The Court will address each of these in turn.

First, the court finds substantial evidence supports Deputy Palmer's finding of industrial disability due to her mental health sequelae injury. It is well-settled that it is "the commissioner who weighs the evidence, not the courts. They only examine it to determine whether it is sufficient to sustain the factual conclusion of the commissioner." *Ziegler v. U.S. Gypsum Co.*, 252 Iowa 613, 616, 106 N.W.2d 591, 593 (1960).

In finding Drahozal did not suffer from complex regional pain syndrome, Deputy Palmer said, "I find the opinion of Dr. Chen more persuasive than Dr. Bansal . . . None of Drahozal's treating providers diagnosed her with complex regional pain syndrome." Arbitration Decision, p. 13. This analysis is supported by the record and will not be overturned.

In finding Drahozal established that she sustained mental health sequelae as a result of her work injury resulting in an industrial disability, Deputy Palmer stated, "I find the opinion of Dr. Mittauer, which is supported by the opinion of Dr. Gersch, most persuasive." Arbitration Decision, p. 14. Deputy Palmer further analyzed that no evidence was provided that Drahozal was experiencing depression or anxiety prior to her work injury" in support of the decision to give the greatest weight to the opinion of Dr. Gersch. Arbitration Decision, p. 14. Again, this court is obligated to give deference to the factual decisions of the Commissioner and will not overturn a decision supported by substantial evidence. *See Ziegler*, 106 N.W.2d at 593.

Regarding the extent of the disability, Deputy Palmer found Drahazol did not satisfy the odd lot doctrine.

> Under [the odd lot] doctrine a worker becomes an odd-lot employee when an injury makes the worker incapable of obtaining employment in any well-known branch of the labor market. An odd-lot worker is thus totally disabled if the only services the worker can perform are "so limited in quality, dependability, or quantity that a reasonably stable market for them does not exist...."

Guyton v. Irving Jensen Co., 373 N.W.2d 101, 105 (Iowa 1985) (quoting *Lee v. Minneapolis Street Railway Co.,* 230 Minn. 315, 320, 41 N.W.2d 433, 436 (1950)). Deputy Palmer stated, "I find the opinions of Drs. Chen and Mittauer most persuasive." Arbitration Decision, p. 16. Deputy Palmer went on to say, "she has experience working for another airline, sand stamping the mail, as a nurse's aide assistance patients with activities of daily living, as an assembler in a factory, as a painter, as a part-time security worker for sporting events, and as a retail clerk, and performing general office and clerical work." Arbitration Decision, p. 16. Deputy Palmer assessed Drahozal's education as a high school graduate with one year and six months of college. Deputy Palmer also noted, "Neither party produced any evidence from a vocational expert concerning Drahozal's functional limitations, transferable skills, or residual capacities." Arbitration Decision, p. 16. Deputy Palmer analyzed the fact Drahozol testified her symptoms have improved in the past six months and she is doing more work at home, combined with the fact that she has not applied for any work, persuasive. Deputy Palmer ultimately found, "Even though she is of advanced age, I believe Drahozal is capable of retraining. Drahozal has not demonstrated she is motivated to return to work." Arbitration Decision, p. 16. It appears the Commissioner found her current symptoms did not make it so there was no reasonably stable market for Drahozal to apply to. *See Guyton* 373 N.W.2d at 105. "It is permissible for the reviewing court to determine the commissioner 'could have' or 'might have' considered certain

pieces of supporting evidence." *Myers v. F.C.A. Servs., Inc*., 592 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999). It is the decision of the trier of fact to determine if there are jobs that the injured worker can compete for. *Gits Mfg. Co. v. Frank*, 855 N.W.2d 195, 198 (Iowa 2014). Deputy Palmer found Drahozal did not prove a prima facie case for the odd-lot doctrine to apply. The Claimant bears the burden of proving her prima facie case in order for the applicability of the odd-lot doctrine "by providing substantial evidence that the worker is not employable in the competitive labor market." *See Guyton*, 373 N.W.2d at 106. Since this decision is one for the trier of fact, this Court will not disturb the factual finding of Deputy Palmer. Therefore, the odd-lot doctrine does not apply.

Even without the odd-lot doctrine, Deputy Palmer found that Drahozal sustained an eighty percent industrial disability. "The extent of industrial disability is a question of fact for the industrial commissioner." *Bearce v. FMC Corp.,* 465 N.W.2d 531, 537 (Iowa 1991). "Industrial disability is gauged by determining the loss to the employee's earning capacity." *Simbro v. Delong's Sportswear*, 332 N.W.2d 886, 887 (Iowa 1983). "Industrial disability is not bound to the organ or body incapacity, but measures the extent to which the injury impairs the employee in the ability to earn wages." *Id.* "In determining industrial disability, consideration may be given to the injured employee's age, education, qualifications, experience and [their] inability, because of the injury, to engage in employment for which [they are] fitted." *Olson v. Goodyear Serv. Stores*, 255 Iowa 1112, 1121, 125 N.W.2d 251, 257 (1963). Deputy Palmer, after considering the factors, found an eighty percent industrial disability. There are facts in the record to support this analysis.

The Iowa Supreme Court said: "This court has repeatedly held that where the evidence is in dispute, or where reasonable minds may differ on the inferences to be drawn from the proven

facts and circumstances, the findings of the commissioner are conclusive." *Ziegler*, 106 N.W.2d at 616. New Hampshire contends the Court should consider the history of the Claimant, the stressors she has faced since, and that she went on vacations since the injury as showing she does not have a permanent mental injury. However, it is well-settled that it is "the commissioner who weighs the evidence, not the courts. They only examine it to determine whether it is sufficient to sustain the factual conclusion of the commissioner." *Id.* at 593. The finding of industrial disability is supported in the record and, as such, the Court will not overturn the decision of Deputy Palmer. *See id.* Because the award of industrial disability was proper, the decisions to award costs, medical expenses, and medical mileage was also proper and will not be overturned.

New Hampshire contends Healing Period Benefits were improperly awarded. If an employee has a permanent disability, "'the payments made prior to payment for permanency are healing period benefits.'" *Dunlap v. Action Warehouse*, 824 N.W.2d 545, 556 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) (quoting *Clark,* 696 N.W.2d at 604). Deputy Palmer found, "Drahozal was unable to return to her former duties with American and retired." Arbitration Decision, p. 16. Because this Court affirmed Deputy Palmer's decision that Drahozal should be awarded Permanent Partial Disability benefits, an award of healing period benefits is proper. *See id.* Iowa Code section 85.34(1) entitles a claimant to healing period benefits from the time of the injury until the claimant is placed on maximum medical improvement ("MMI"). *See id.* Here, Drahazol was placed on MMI by Dr. Mittauer on February 10, 2017. Accordingly, the award of healing period benefits from January 12, 2015, until February 10, 2017, was proper. The award of healing period benefits is affirmed.

The final issue for the Court to decide is if the imposition of penalty benefits was proper. New Hampshire claims no penalty benefits should have been awarded, because the payments

that were awarded penalty benefits were only a few days late. Drahozal argues penalty benefits should have been awarded for the entire denial of her mental injury claim. Deputy Palmer found penalty benefits should not be awarded on the denial of causation with the mental sequela injury, because there was a reasonable basis to contest the coverage. Arbitration Decision, p. 20. Penalty benefits are not awarded if there is a reasonable basis to contest the claimant's entitlement to benefits. *See Christensen v. Snap-On Tools Corp*, 554 N.W.2d 254, 260 (Iowa 1996). Because there was evidence to support a reasonable basis for contesting the coverage, denying causation was reasonable for New Hampshire and penalty benefits will not be imposed. *See id.* Therefore, Deputy Palmer's denial of penalty benefits on the sequela injury is affirmed.

Deputy Palmer did award penalty benefits for the late payment of benefits. "[T]he focus is on whether timely payment of the benefits due was made and if not, whether there was a reasonable excuse for the failure to make timely payment of the amount owed." *Christensen,* 554 N.W.2d at 260. Commissioners are given discretion in choosing to award penalty benefits and consider, "the length of the delay, the number of the delays, the information available to the employer regarding the employee's injuries and wages, and the prior penalties imposed against the employer under section 86.13." *Robbennolt v. Snap-On Tools Corp*., 555 N.W.2d 229, 238 (Iowa 1996). Deputy Palmer held, "American and New Hampshire provided no explanation for the late paid benefits." Arbitration Decision, p. 20. Because there was no reasonable excuse given for the delay in payments, the award of penalty benefits was proper. *See Christensen,* 554 N.W.2d at 260. While New Hampshire contends the amount assessed as penalty benefits was unreasonable given the time of the delay, this Court will not overturn the decision of Deputy Palmer. It is within the power of the Commission to weigh the factors provided and assess

penalties accordingly. *See Robbennolt,* 555 N.W.2d at 238. This court is not the finder of fact and will not overturn a decision by the Commissioner within their discretion.

For all the reasons stated, the decisions of Deputy Palmer were supported in the record and in line with Iowa Law. Further, the decision was reviewed on a de novo review by the Commissioner and was affirmed in full. Appeal Decision, p. 2. The decision of the Iowa Workers' Compensation Commission is affirmed in full.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the ruling of the Commissioner is **AFFIRMED**.

State of Iowa Courts

Type: OTHER ORDER

Case Number	**Case Title**
CVCV057115	RUKHSANA DRAHOZAL V ENVOY AIR ET AL

So Ordered

Scott D. Rosenberg, District Court Judge,
Fifth Judicial District of Iowa