BEFORE THE IOWA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSIONER

JORDAN JONES, Claimant, vs. DEXTER LAUNDRY, Employer, and SENTINEL INSURANCE COMPANY, Insurance Carrier, Defendants.	:	File No. 21012114.01 A R B I T R A T I O N D E C I S I O N Head Note No. 1402.50

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The claimant, Jordan Jones, filed a petition for arbitration on May 20, 2021 against Dexter Laundry, employer, and Sentinel Insurance Company, insurance carrier. The claimant was represented by Michael Carpenter. The defendants were represented by Jason Wiltfang.

The matter came on for hearing on June 23, 2022, before Deputy Workers' Compensation Commissioner Joe Walsh in Des Moines, Iowa via Zoom videoconferencing. The record in the case consists of Joint Exhibits 1 through 3.1; Claimant's Exhibits 1 through 11; and Defense Exhibits A through I. The claimant testified at hearing, in addition to Benton Jones, claimant's brother. Janice Doud served as the court reporter for the proceedings. The matter was fully submitted on August 1, 2022, after helpful briefing by the parties.

ISSUES

The parties submitted the following issues for determination:

1. Whether claimant sustained a cumulative injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment and, if so, the date the injury manifested.

2. Whether employer has proven a notice defense under Iowa Code section 85.23.

3. Whether claimant's condition is a cause of any temporary or permanent disability.

4. Whether claimant is entitled to temporary disability benefits.

5. Whether the claimant is entitled to permanent disability benefits, and if so the nature and extent of the disability.

6. The commencement date for any permanent disability benefits.

7. Past and future medical expenses.

STIPULATIONS

Through the hearing report, the parties stipulated to the following:

1. The parties had an employer-employee relationship.

2. The weekly rate of compensation is $464.97.

3. Affirmative defenses have been waived with the exception of the affirmative defense of notice as set forth above.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Jordan Jones was 38 years old as of the date of hearing. He testified live and under oath at the video hearing. His testimony is generally credible.

Mr. Jones began working for Dexter Laundry in the spring of 2019. At the time he began working, he had no chronic health issues or medical restrictions.

In early October 2019, Mr. Jones was placed in a job called "sorting and deburring." (Transcript, page 16) This position required him to lift and maneuver heavy sheets of metal in the manufacturing process. Mr. Jones testified that usually two or more people performed this job, but he was placed in this job by himself. He testified that the position required heavy labor, lifting and maneuvering large awkward pieces of metal to grind off sharp edges. (Tr., pp. 16-18; Defendants' Exhibit A, Jones Depo, pages 15-17)

Mr. Jones testified that this position caused him to have significant pain throughout his entire body, but particularly in his neck and upper back. (Tr., p. 18) He testified that within a couple of weeks, the pain was so bad, he complained to his supervisor, Jason Knaack. (Id.) "I told him that I was in . . . my whole body hurt and I couldn't keep doing this at this pace without any help and I needed him to get somebody hired." (Tr., p. 18) He testified that after about three months he asked to move jobs because of the pain he was experiencing. He transferred to a position called "spot weld." (Tr., p. 19) He testified that after he moved jobs, his body started to heal, however, he continued to have pain in his neck on both sides and across his upper

back. (Tr., p. 21)

Mr. Jones first sought chiropractic treatment for his upper back and neck on January 17, 2020. (Joint Exhibit 1, p. 1) The chiropractic notes are not particularly illuminating regarding the history of the injury. (Jt. Ex. 1, pp. 1-10) He saw the chiropractor a total of four times, and it did not help much. The chiropractor diagnosed cervicalgia and cervical radiculopathy. (Jt. Ex. 1, p. 2) On or about January 27, 2020, he reported to his supervisor that his job was too physically demanding and asked to be moved to a lighter position. (Claimant Exhibit 7; Tr., pp. 19-20) Mr. Jones testified that he specifically told his employer that he needed to move because of a work injury, although this is not documented in the memorandum in his personnel records.

After getting little relief from the chiropractic treatments, Mr. Jones went to Sebastian Harris, M.D., at Jefferson County Health Center. His first appointment with Dr. Harris was January 29, 2020. This was right around the same time he moved to the spot weld job. At that visit, he described neck pain. "Patient started a new job within his employer. Patient is lifting large sheets of metal. He has to run the spot welder at the same time." (Jt. Ex. 2, p. 1) Examination revealed a reduced range of motion in the upper back along with pain and spasms and Dr. Harris noted that he suspected a repetitive injury. (Jt. Ex. 2, p. 3) These notes are highly supportive of the development of a repetitive work injury. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Jones started physical therapy. When Mr. Jones returned to Dr. Harris on February 17, 2020, Dr. Harris placed him on light-duty and recommended continuing with the therapy. (Jt. Ex. 2, p. 23)

Mr. Jones then informed Dexter that he was placed on light-duty due to his neck condition. Dexter had no light-duty work, so he was provided short-term disability and a leave of absence while he underwent physical therapy. (Tr., pp. 27-29) The employer's payroll records reflect that Mr. Jones received sickness and accident payments from February 10, 2020, through April 5, 2020. (Def. Ex. I, pp. 6-13) Based upon the evidence in the record, it appears that Mr. Jones' first day of lost work for his neck condition was February 10, 2020. This is the date he was plainly aware of his work injury.

Mr. Jones underwent 10 physical therapy sessions through March 13, 2020. (Jt. Ex. 2) The medical file reflects that while his symptoms improved some, his condition never fully healed. For example, on March 13, 2020, the following is documented in physical therapy records: "Patient has been seen for 1 month of therapy following a work related injury with ability to progress with exercises/manual techniques . . . patient has continued to report soreness and pain and reports concerns regarding returning to work due to physical job." (Jt. Ex. 2, p. 36)

Mr. Jones testified that he had a meeting with Katie Six, a human resources manager for Dexter, when he went off work sometime in February 2020. It is surprising that there is no documentation of this meeting in the record. Mr. Jones testified that he told Ms. Six that "he would like to make it official at that time that it was a work comp issue." (Tr., p. 26) He testified essentially that Ms. Six discouraged him from doing this. (Tr., pp. 29, 33-34) Again, there is no written documentation of the nature of his leave

of absence in the record. The employer did not call any witnesses at hearing, nor did it present any specific written documentation memorializing the nature of this leave of absence. This meeting is a critical piece of evidence in this case. The only evidence about the meeting is claimant's testimony.

Mr. Jones' brother, Benton Jones, also testified at hearing. Benton Jones also worked at Dexter. His testimony is generally credible. He testified he trained his brother on the sorting and deburring job. Benton testified that his brother complained that the work was too much and was injuring him. (Tr., pp. 114-115) While much of Benton's testimony was somewhat vague, he did have the following exchange:

> Q. Were you witness to Jordan ever complaining to any of the supervisors or foremen or management at Dexter about the pain he was experiencing on that job [sorting and deburring]?
>
> A. Yes.
>
> Q. If you can recall, can you tell me who that would have been and when?
>
> A. The first time I saw anything it was with Jason Knaak, which was our direct supervisor at the time. I was actually standing with them as they talked about it.
>
> Q. And did Jordan tell him that he thought that this job was causing him pain?
>
> A. Yeah.

(Tr., p. 116)

Dr. Harris reexamined Mr. Jones on March 17, 2020, documenting he still had "decreased range of motion, tenderness and pain" in his cervical area. (Jt. Ex. 2, p. 41) He ordered an MRI which was performed the following week. (Jt. Ex. 2, pp. 45-46) Following the MRI, Dr. Harris offered an epidural steroid injection (ESI) for treatment. (Jt. Ex. 2, p. 47)

Dexter Laundry was temporarily closed in March 2020, due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The pandemic also resulted in a short delay to Mr. Jones' treatment. Mr. Jones testified that he asked Dr. Harris to release him back to work, so he could qualify for unemployment benefits while the plant was closed. (Tr., p. 32; Jt. Ex. 2, pp. 48, 55) Mr. Jones testified that his symptoms had not, in fact, subsided. Mr. Jones testified that the plant reopened for a week in May 2020, and he did, in fact, return to work for that week but was in pain. (Tr., pp. 35-36) On May 7, 2020, Dr. Harris reevaluated Mr. Jones and ended up referring him to a spine specialist.

Patrick Hitchon, M.D., evaluated Mr. Jones on May 18, 2020. Dr. Hitchon documented the heavy lifting for Dexter. (Jt. Ex. 3, p. 1) He ultimately diagnosed neck pain and opined that the condition was degenerative and not surgical. (Jt. Ex. 3, p. 5)

Mr. Jones testified that Dr. Hitchon told him he would need a neck fusion in the future. (Tr., p. 37) Mr. Jones continued thereafter to treat with Dr. Harris, mainly with medications, including narcotics, and ESIs. The medical notes document his condition and ongoing symptoms were serious. (Jt. Ex. 2, pp. 72-86)

The defendants submitted a document which purports to be a written notice of claimant's alleged injury to the defendants. (Def. Ex. B, p. 2) It is unclear when Mr. Jones wrote this or provided it to defendants. This hand-written "notice" is attached to a June 16, 2020, letter from defense counsel to a lawyer who represented claimant at that time. It states, "I will be filing a worker's compensation claim for the injury to my neck that happened during my employment at Dexter." (Def. Ex. B, p. 2) There is, what appears to be, a sticky note on this notice which states "received 5/18/2020 via mail" but it is unclear who wrote this note. In their brief, defendants contend that this was the first time they ever received notice of a work injury. (Def. Brief, p. 2)

On June 21, 2020, Mr. Jones was called back into work as the plant reopened. He testified he managed to complete a full day on the 21st but on the second day he had to leave after 5 hours. (Tr., p. 39) He testified Katie Six told him that if he did not show up for his work shift, he would be terminated. (Tr., p. 40) Mr. Jones filed for unemployment and was eventually awarded benefits. (Cl. Ex. 11) Mr. Jones has not been employed in any capacity since his employment with Dexter ended. He has not looked for work. As of the date of hearing, he does not believe he is capable of performing any work.

On July 1, 2020, Dr. Harris placed Mr. Jones on light-duty with a 5-pound limit for lifting or pulling. (Jt. Ex. 2, p. 71) He had another ESI on July 23, 2020. It did not help. Mr. Jones testified he would like to have another surgical consultation. He testified that, without insurance, he has been unable to secure such an appointment. He has been unable to obtain any meaningful treatment since leaving Dexter. He applied for Social Security Disability (SSD) after being terminated by Dexter. He had an evaluation with Jan Hunter, D.O., in August 2020. (Def. Ex. G, p. 5) These records generally validate claimant's injury and condition, however, it was determined that he did not meet the criteria for total disability under SSD rules. (Def. Ex. G, p. 9)

Since his termination, Mr. Jones has been diagnosed with "right acoustic schwannoma" which causes hearing loss and other symptoms. (Jt. Ex. 3, p. 8)

An IME was performed on March 23, 2021, by Charles Wenzel, D.O. Dr. Wenzel reviewed appropriate records, interviewed Mr. Jones and examined him. He diagnosed cervicalgia and a C5-C6 moderate disc bulge. (Cl. Ex. 1, p. 6) He opined these conditions resulted from a cumulative trauma injury during the first week of October 2019. He opined Mr. Jones is not at maximum medical improvement and requires further surgical consultation. "Mr. Jones has a moderate disc bulge at C5-C6 and has occasional bilateral upper extremity radicular symptoms. . . I recommend a second neurosurgical opinion for discussion of a microdiscectomy." (Cl. Ex. 1, p. 6)

Defendants secured a report from Trevor Schmitz, M.D., who performed a record

review in May 2022. (Def. Ex. E) Dr. Schmitz diagnosed "self-reported neck pain …" (Def. Ex. E, p. 6) With regard to medical causation he opined the following. "Repetitive work activities have never been shown to be a risk factor for aggravation of neck conditions." (Def. Ex. E, p. 6) He offered other opinions as well. None of Dr. Schmitz's opinions are convincing.

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, I find that Mr. Jones sustained a cumulative injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment while performing heavy work for Dexter. The pain was initially throughout his entire body. He began this work at some point in October 2019, and continued performing it for approximately three months until he bid out of it because it was too heavy. I find that the cumulative injury manifested on or about February 10, 2020, when he was taken off work for neck pain. By this point in time, he had left the sorting and deburring job and the pain throughout his entire body was gone. At that time, he was left with pain in his upper back and neck.

I find that Mr. Jones verbally communicated about the circumstances of his injury and symptoms to his employer around the time he went off work in February 2020. I find that the employer has failed to meet its burden to demonstrate a valid notice defense. The only evidence offered by the defendants at hearing was Defendants' Exhibit B, which is an undated, unexplained written notice which lacks any meaningful context. Simply stated, the defendants presented no competent evidence to support a notice defense.

By a preponderance of evidence, I find that Mr. Jones was placed on significant medical restrictions in July 2020, and has not performed any work since such time. He has been unable to secure additional medical treatment because he lost his health insurance.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The first question is whether the claimant sustained an injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment.

The claimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged injury actually occurred and that it both arose out of and in the course of the employment. Quaker Oats Co. v. Ciha, 552 N.W.2d 143 (Iowa 1996); Miedema v. Dial Corp., 551 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1996). The words "arising out of" refer to the cause or source of the injury. The words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, and circumstances of the injury. 2800 Corp. v. Fernandez, 528 N.W.2d 124 (Iowa 1995). An injury arises out of the employment when a causal relationship exists between the injury and the employment. Miedema, 551 N.W.2d 309. The injury must be a rational consequence of a hazard connected with the employment and not merely incidental to the employment. Koehler Elec. v. Wills, 608 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2000); Miedema, 551 N.W.2d 309. An injury occurs "in the course of" employment when it happens within a period of employment at a place where the employee reasonably may be when

performing employment duties and while the employee is fulfilling those duties or doing an activity incidental to them. Ciha, 552 N.W.2d 143.

A personal injury contemplated by the workers' compensation law means an injury, the impairment of health or a disease resulting from an injury which comes about, not through the natural building up and tearing down of the human body, but because of trauma. The injury must be something that acts extraneously to the natural processes of nature and thereby impairs the health, interrupts or otherwise destroys or damages a part or all of the body. Although many injuries have a traumatic onset, there is no requirement for a special incident or an unusual occurrence. Injuries which result from cumulative trauma are compensable. Increased disability from a prior injury, even if brought about by further work, does not constitute a new injury, however. St. Luke's Hosp. v. Gray, 604 N.W.2d 646 (Iowa 2000); Ellingson v. Fleetguard, Inc., 599 N.W.2d 440 (Iowa 1999); Dunlavey v. Economy Fire and Cas. Co., 526 N.W.2d 845 (Iowa 1995); McKeever Custom Cabinets v. Smith, 379 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1985). An occupational disease covered by chapter 85A is specifically excluded from the definition of personal injury. Iowa Code section 85.61(4)(b); Iowa Code section 85A.8; Iowa Code section 85A.14.

When the injury develops gradually over time, the cumulative injury rule applies. The date of injury for cumulative injury purposes is the date on which the disability manifests. Manifestation is best characterized as that date on which both the fact of injury and the causal relationship of the injury to the claimant's employment would be plainly apparent to a reasonable person. The date of manifestation inherently is a fact-based determination. The fact-finder is entitled to substantial latitude in making this determination and may consider a variety of factors, none of which is necessarily dispositive in establishing a manifestation date. Among others, the factors may include missing work when the condition prevents performing the job, or receiving significant medical care for the condition. For time limitation purposes, the discovery rule then becomes pertinent so the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the employee, as a reasonable person, knows or should know, that the cumulative injury condition is serious enough to have a permanent, adverse impact on his or her employment. Herrera v. IBP, Inc., 633 N.W.2d 284 (Iowa 2001); Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. v. Tasler, 483 N.W.2d 824 (Iowa 1992); McKeever Custom Cabinets v. Smith, 379 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1985).

In cumulative injury cases, the issue of the injury is often intertwined with the issue of medical causation. That is to say, this issue becomes whether the type of work that the claimant was performing is a substantial causal or aggravating factor of his diagnosis or condition.

The claimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury is a proximate cause of the disability on which the claim is based. A cause is proximate if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the result; it need not be the only cause. A preponderance of the evidence exists when the causal connection is probable rather than merely possible. George A. Hormel & Co. v. Jordan, 569 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa

1997); Frye v. Smith-Doyle Contractors, 569 N.W.2d 154 (Iowa App. 1997); Sanchez v. Blue Bird Midwest, 554 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa App. 1996).

The question of causal connection is essentially within the domain of expert testimony. The expert medical evidence must be considered with all other evidence introduced bearing on the causal connection between the injury and the disability. Supportive lay testimony may be used to buttress the expert testimony and, therefore, is also relevant and material to the causation question. The weight to be given to an expert opinion is determined by the finder of fact and may be affected by the accuracy of the facts the expert relied upon as well as other surrounding circumstances. The expert opinion may be accepted or rejected, in whole or in part. St. Luke's Hosp. v. Gray, 604 N.W.2d 646 (Iowa 2000); IBP, Inc. v. Harpole, 621 N.W.2d 410 (Iowa 2001); Dunlavey v. Economy Fire and Cas. Co., 526 N.W.2d 845 (Iowa 1995). Miller v. Lauridsen Foods, Inc., 525 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa 1994). Unrebutted expert medical testimony cannot be summarily rejected. Poula v. Siouxland Wall & Ceiling, Inc., 516 N.W.2d 910 (Iowa App. 1994).

For the reasons set forth in the Findings of Fact, I find that the claimant has proven by a preponderance of evidence that he sustained an injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment with Dexter. This finding is based upon claimant's credible testimony, the contemporaneous medical notes from Dr. Harris, as well as the expert medical opinions of Dr. Wenzel. I find that the cumulative injury manifested on or about February 10, 2020, which was the date he first lost work due to disability/pain.

The next question submitted is whether the claimant provided timely notice of his February 10, 2020, work injury.

Iowa Code section 85.23 requires an employee to give notice of the occurrence of an injury to the employer within 90 days from the date of the occurrence, unless the employer has actual knowledge of the occurrence of the injury.

The purpose of the 90-day notice or actual knowledge requirement is to give the employer an opportunity to timely investigate the facts surrounding the injury. The actual knowledge alternative to notice is met when the employer, as a reasonably conscientious manager, is alerted to the possibility of a potential compensation claim through information which makes the employer aware that the injury occurred and that it may be work related. Dillinger v. City of Sioux City, 368 N.W.2d 176 (Iowa 1985); Robinson v. Department of Transp., 296 N.W.2d 809 (Iowa 1980).

Failure to give notice is an affirmative defense which the employer must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. DeLong v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 229 Iowa 700, 295 N.W. 91 (1940).

I find, by a preponderance of evidence, that the employer has failed to prove a valid notice defense for the reasons set forth in the Findings of Fact.

This case was made more complicated than it probably should have been. The

first problem was the claimant alleged an October 1, 2019, injury date. According to the evidence in the record, claimant had not even started the sorting and deburring job on October 1, 2019. And while he began having pain almost immediately after starting this heavy work, he described the pain generally as impacting his whole body. It is entirely unclear based upon the record submitted, why October 1, 2019, was chosen as an injury date. Based upon the evidence submitted, no cumulative injury manifested until at least February 10, 2020, the date he first lost work. Therefore, the employer needed to have notice or actual knowledge within 90 days of February 10, 2020.

The second complicating factor is that the overall documentation of claimant's employment circumstances in 2019 to 2020 in the record is abysmal. At a minimum I expected to see some documentation of claimant's short-term disability claim and/or leave of absence.

The employer hinged its entire notice defense upon a written notice contained in Defendants' Exhibit B. To state that this letter is unexplained and entirely without context would be an understatement. The hand-written letter is undated and attached to a letter from defense counsel to claimant's previous attorney. (Def. Ex. B, pp. 1-2) There does appear to be a sticky note attached to this "notice" which states "Rec'd 5/18/2020 via mail." (Def. Ex. B, p. 2) There is no explanation for the sticky note. The defendants assert in their brief that this was the first "indication" they ever received of the injury. (Def. Brief, p. 2) It is noted that a company named Optum had written to Dexter in April 2020, requesting workers' compensation information. (Def. Ex. H, p. 2) While this letter is also largely unexplained, it does, to some degree contradict defendants' assertion that they had no "indication" of any work injury until May 2020.

Other than the defendants' bare assertion that the hand-written letter was the first "indication" that Mr. Jones was alleging a work injury and that this letter was first received on May 18, 2020, there is no evidence in this record whatsoever to support these findings. Consequently the defendants have failed to meet their burden of proof. The absence of any supporting testimony from Dexter management, combined with the paucity of contemporaneous documentation, is significant.

I find it most likely that Mr. Jones did have a meeting with Dexter when he went on leave of absence in February 2020, and that he most likely told them at that time that he sustained an injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment. (Tr., pp. 26, 29, 33-34)

The next issue is claimant's entitlement to benefits.

The employer shall furnish reasonable surgical, medical, dental, osteopathic, chiropractic, podiatric, physical rehabilitation, nursing, ambulance, and hospital services and supplies for all conditions compensable under the workers' compensation law. The employer shall also allow reasonable and necessary transportation expenses incurred for those services. The employer has the right to choose the provider of care, except where the employer has denied liability for the injury. Section 85.27. Holbert v. Townsend Engineering Co., Thirty-second Biennial Report of the Industrial

Commissioner 78 (Review-Reopening October 1975).

When an injured worker has been unable to work during a period of recuperation from an injury that did not produce permanent disability, the worker is entitled to temporary total disability benefits during the time the worker is disabled by the injury. Those benefits are payable until the employee has returned to work, or is medically capable of returning to work substantially similar to the work performed at the time of injury. Iowa Code section 85.33(1) (2021).

An application for alternate medical care is not automatically sustained because claimant is dissatisfied with the care he has been receiving. Mere dissatisfaction with the medical care is not ample grounds for granting an application for alternate medical care. Rather, the claimant must show that the care was not offered promptly, was not reasonably suited to treat the injury, or that the care was unduly inconvenient for the claimant. Long v. Roberts Dairy Co., 528 N.W.2d 122 (Iowa 1995).

I find that claimant is entitled to a running award of temporary total or healing period benefits commencing on July 1, 2020, up through the date of hearing and continuing until such time as benefits may end, under Iowa Code section 85.33(1) (2021). Claimant was placed on severely limiting restrictions by Dr. Harris on July 1, 2020, and those restrictions have not been lifted. (Jt. Ex. 2, p. 71) He is not at maximum medical improvement and requires further treatment. (Cl. Ex. 1, pp. 6-7)

I further find that claimant is entitled to the reimbursement of the medical expenses and mileage set forth in Claimant's Exhibits 3 and 4. Claimant is entitled to future medical treatment for his condition. Dr. Harris shall direct his medical treatment.

ORDER

THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED:

All benefits shall be paid at the rate agreed upon by the parties of four hundred sixty-four and 97/100 dollars ($464.97).

Defendants shall pay temporary total disability benefits from February 10, 2020, through May 4, 2020, and then as a running award from July 1, 2020, up through the date of hearing and continuing forward until such time that the elements of Iowa Code section 85.33(1) have been met.

Defendants shall pay accrued weekly benefits in a lump sum.

Defendants shall pay interest on unpaid weekly benefits awarded herein as set forth in Iowa Code section 85.30.

Defendants shall reimburse medical expenses set forth in Claimant's Exhibits 3 and 4.

Defendants shall authorize treatment with Dr. Sebastian Harris.

Defendants are entitled to a credit for disability income paid under Iowa Code section 85.38(2), in the amount of two thousand ninety-six and 24/100 dollars ($2,096.24), as stipulated by the parties.

Defendants shall file subsequent reports of injury as required by this agency pursuant to rule 876 IAC 3.1(2).

Costs are taxed to defendants in the amount of two thousand three hundred eighty-five and 70/100 dollars ($2,385.70).

Signed and filed this __17th__ day of February 2023.

JOSEPH L. WALSH
DEPUTY WORKERS'
COMPENSATION COMMISSIONER

The parties have been served, as follows:

H. Edwin Detlie (via WCES)

Michael Carpenter (via WCES)

Jason Wiltfang (via WCES)

Right to Appeal: This decision shall become final unless you or another interested party appeals within 20 days from the date above, pursuant to rule 876-4.27 (17A, 86) of the Iowa Administrative Code. The notice of appeal must be filed via Workers' Compensation Electronic System (WCES) unless the filing party has been granted permission by the Division of Workers' Compensation to file documents in paper form. If such permission has been granted, the notice of appeal must be filed at the following address: Workers' Compensation Commissioner, Iowa Division of Workers' Compensation, 150 Des Moines Street, Des Moines, Iowa 50309-1836. The notice of appeal must be received by the Division of Workers' Compensation within 20 days from the date of the decision. The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or legal holiday.